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IN LIGHT OF THE EVIL PRESENTED: WHAT
KIND OF PROPHYLACTIC ANTI-
DISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION CAN
CONGRESS ENACT AFTER GARRETT?
Abstract: In recent years, the Supreme Court has repeatedly invalidated
congressional legislation enacted pursuant to Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court has severely restricted this avenue
for Congress to remedy and prevent discrimination. Soon, the Court
may have the opportunity to address this issue again and resolve a
circuit split concerning the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993. In
light of this opportunity, this Note examines the evolution and scope of
the Section 5 power. The Note traces the history and varied
interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as Section 5
legislation and Court precedents reviewing that legislation. The Note
concludes that when faced with the issue again, the Court should return
to its former deference to congressional efforts to remedy and prevent
discrimination pursuant to Section 5.
INTRODUCTION
Much ink has been spilled over the increasingly restrictive stance
of the Supreme Court of the United States toward Congress's power
to legislate under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. ] Since
1997, the Court has invalidated provisions in five different federal
statutes on grounds that Congress lacked power to enact the legisla-
tion under Section 5.2 This period represents the first time since Re-
I See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Appropriate" Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 53
STAN. L. REV. 1127 (2001); Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 Mot. L.
REV. 80 (2001); Samuel Estreicher & Margaret H. Lemos, The Section 5 Mystique, Morrison,
and the Future of Federal Antidiscrimination Law, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 109 (2000); Michael W.
McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique ofCity of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L.
REv. 153 (1997); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidis-
crimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441 (2000); Aviam Soifer, Full
and Equal Rights of Conscience, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 469 (2000).
2 See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (Americans with
Disabilities Act); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (Violence Against
Women Act); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000) (Age Discrimination in
Employment Act); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. Coil. Say. Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 630, 647 (1999) (Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act); City
of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512 (1997) (Religious Freedom Restoration Act).
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construction that the Court has denied Congress's power to enact an-
tidiscrimination legislation. 3
 This trend, denounced as "fundamen-
tally misguided" by one set of commentators, seriously calls into ques-
tion Congress's continued efficacy in the protection of individual
rights :1
Among the chief targets in this clash between the Court and
Congress have been provisions of federal employment antidiscrimina-
tion laws that operate directly on the states. 5 This leads some com-
mentators to speculate that the Court is deliberately sapping Con-
gress's ability to lead the fight against discrimination by repeatedly
invalidating federal employment legislation.6
 These analysts fear for
the continued vitality of various pieces of federal legislation that many
Americans regard as cornerstones of the nation's commitment to
equality.'
The future of federal antidiscrimination legislation largely fo-
cuses on Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment
under Section 5.8
 This is because the Commerce Clause, which Con-
gress previously relied on as the constitutional basis for most of its
post-New Deal antidiscrimination legislation, is—due to recent Court
holdings—no longer a viable way for Congress to enforce antidis-
crimination norms directly against the states. 8 In light of the great
amount of attention this area is receiving from the courts and legal
academics, as well as the grave practical implications the Court's Sec-
tion 5 rulings have for individual rights, it is useful to gauge more
precisely where Congress's power to legislate under Section 5 stands
today. 1° Nevertheless, although the Court's Section 5 rulings are tre-
mendously consequential for the national fight against discrimina-
tion, they are also notoriously imprecise. 11
s Estreicher & Lemos, supra note 1, at 110; Post & Siegel, supra note 1, at 443.
*Post & Siegel, supra note 1, at 513; see Soifer, supra note 1, at 488.
5 Melissa Hart, Conflating Scope of Right with Standard of Review: The Supreme Court's "Strict
Scrutiny" of Congressional Efforts to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 Vim- L. Rsv. 1091,
1091 (2001).
6 See Colker & Brudney, supra note 1, at 83-84.
7 See Hart, supra note 5, at 1092 (suggesting that the Court's current approach may
eventually limit federal employment legislation to preventing only racial discrimination).
Set Caminker, supra note 1, at 1129; Hart, supra note 5, at 1095.
9 Caminker, supra note 1, at 1129; Hart, supra note 5, at 1094; Post & Siegel, supra note
1, at 443,451; see infra notes 107-108 and accompanying text.
to see Hart, supra note 5, at 1095-96.
"Post & Siegel, supra note 1, at 443.
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The Court may soon clarify its Section 5 rules if it takes the op-
portunity to consider another piece of federal antidiscrimination leg-
islation, the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA) .12 Re
-cently, the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit split over the
constitutionality of one of its provisions, as it applies to state employ-
ers. 15 This legislation is different from legislation the Court has previ-
ously faced because section 2612 of the FMLA was enacted to combat
discrimination against women, a quasi-suspect class. 14
 Until the Court
speaks definitively, the way these Courts of Appeals treat this legisla-
tion may help us learn more about what the new Section 5 rules mean
for Congress's power to enact prophylactic antidiscrimination legisla-
tion. 15
Until the present era, the Court had not found that Congress
lacked power to enact antidiscrimination legislation since Reconstruc-
tion. 16 The Court's recent activity demonstrates a radical change in
the types of discrimination the Court will allow Congress to attack and
the methods it will allow Congress to use. 17 This Note argues that by
encouraging federal courts to uncover congressional motive, as ex-
emplified by the treatment of the FMLA in the two Courts of Appeals,
the Court's contemporary approach unjustifiably encroaches on con-
gressional prerogatives and seriously threatens Congress's constitu-
tional duty to contend with the most widespread forms of discrimina-
tion.18
Part I of this Note explores the role of history in interpreting
Congress's power under the Fourteenth Amendment. 19
 It focuses
primarily on the history of the Amendment's drafting and the prece-
dents that followed, as well as what they reveal about the meaning and
.19 See Family and Medical Leave Act: FMLA Ruling Diggers Split over State Immunity from
Suit, 16 Andrews Ernpl. Litig. Rep. No. 8, at 10 ( Jan. 8, 2002).
13 Id. Compare Hibbs v. Dep't of Human Res., 273 F.3d 844, 858 (9th Cir. 2001), petition
for cert. filed, 70 U.S.L.W. 3597 (U.S. Mar. 11, 2002) (No. 01-1368) (concluding •that this
FMLA provision was properly enacted under Section 5), with Kazmier v. Widmann, 225
F.3d 519, 526 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that the provision was not valid Section 5 legisla-
tion).
14 Brian Ray, Note, "Out the Window"? Prospects for the EPA and FMLA after Kimel v. Flor-
ida Board of Regents, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1755, 1779 (2000).
15 See Hibbs, 273 F.sa 844; Kazmier, 225 F.3d 519.
16 Estreicher & Lentos, supra note 1, at 110; Post & Siegel, supra note 1, at 443.
11 See infra notes 250-286 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 329-364 and accompanying text.
19 See infra Part I.
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range of Section 5. 20 Part II surveys the Court's most recent cases ad-
dressing Congress's power under Section 5. 21 Part III critically reviews
a split between the United States Courts of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit and the Fifth Circuit over the constitutionality of a provision of
another piece of Section 5 legislation, the FMLA. 22 Part IV discusses
the scope and reach of the Section 5 power; and contrasts the present
treatment of Section 5 with that originally envisioned by its framers."
Finally, Part V analyzes Congress's power to enact prophylactic anti-
discrimination legislation under Section 5 as it is informed by the
courts' divergent treatment of the FMLA."
I. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: ITS TEXT, FRAMING, AND
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment demands that no state
"deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws."25 Section 5 reads, "The Congress shall have power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." 26
Despite this seemingly straightforward text, however, Congress's
power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment is, and has long been,
very controversia1. 27 Much of the controversy stems from the degree
of independence Congress may assume in interpreting the Amend-
ment's guarantees." Is Congress strictly bound by the Court's inter-
pretations of Section 1, or is Congress armed by Section 5 with some
degree of independent interpretive power?" •
It is important to consider the Section's drafting history because
the Court and observers have offered various interpretations of it and,
in so doing, have drawn conflicting inferences from it regarding the
28 See id.
21
 See infra Part II.
n See infra Part III.
23 See infra Part W.
24 See infra Part V.
25 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
2° U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
27 See 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5--16, at 936 (3d ed.
2000); Soifer, supra note 1, at 491.
28 See Caminker, supra note 1, at 1132; McConnell, supra note 1, at 170-73.
" McConnell, supra note 1, at 170-73.
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scope of congressional power. 3° For example, the current Supreme
Court underscores the importance of historical evidence concerning
Section 5's drafting for the conclusion that Congress's power was al-
ways meant to be remedial, not substantive." As support for its deduc-
tion, the Court consistently notes the opposition waged against the
first draft of the Amendment." This draft read:
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall
be necessary and proper to secure to the citizens of each
State all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several
States, and to all persons in the several States equal protec-
tion in the rights of life, liberty, and property."
This version was ultimately rejected in favor of the Amendment in its
current form, with prohibitions against the states enumerated in Sec-
tion 1 and Congress's enforcement power granted in Section 5, 34
From this structural change, the Court has inferred that "Congress'
power was no longer plenary but remedial." 33 By reading the
Amendment's drafting history in this particular way, the Court uncov-
ers a reduced role for Congress."
Even so, scholars question the present Court's characterization of
the drafting history of Section 5. 57 They criticize the Court for, for ex-
ample, relying on isolated quotations in opposition to the first draft
from the floor debate without demonstrating how those statements
related to the final version of the Amendment." It is possible, likely
even, that the changes made to the Amendment had nothing at all to
do with whether Congress was to have independent interpretive
" Compare City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520-24 (1997) (relying on Amend-
ment's drafting in concluding that Section 5 was intended to be remedial, not substantive,
power), with Caminker, supra note 1, at 1158-59 (questioning the Court's historical meth-
odology and arguing that history does notprovide argument for more scrutiny to Section
5 legislation), and McConnell, supra note 1, at 164, 176-83 (disputing the Court's conclu-
sions in Boerne and arguing that the Amendment's framers never intended the judiciary to
have exclusive power over defining unconstitutional state acts).
31 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520-24; McConnell, supra note 1, at 164; see infra notes 80-
83 and accompanying text.
32 See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
53 Id.
34
 See id. at 522.
35 Id.
" See id. at 520-24.
53 See Caminker, supra note 1, at 1159-62; McConnell, supra note 1, at 164.
38 McConnell, supra note 1, at 164.
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authority under Section 5." What is clear, at least, is that the Court's
reasoning from history in City of Boerne v. Flores is not conclusively
supported.°
It may ultimately be futile to attempt to define precisely the in-
tentions of the Fourteenth Amendment's framers regarding the scope
of Congress's power." Nevertheless, evidence from its drafting history
solidly supports the proposition that the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment "intended to improve society" by guaranteeing to all per-
sons their natural rights under the Constitution. 42
 In order to accom-
plish this goal, the Amendment's drafters employed two main tools:
first, they gave Congress, not the Court, the primary role in securing
the Amendment's protections,_ and second, they neutralized state re-
sistance to equality in civil rights with robust federal power. 43
The framers designed a special role for Congress in the enforce-
ment of the Fourteenth Amendment through Section 5." According
to former Chief Justice Earl Warren, "[Section 5] was a rather clear
mandate to Congress to undertake the task of defining and securing
the rights guaranteed ... by the amendment. "45
 In fact, Section 5 can
be seen in large part as a reaction to the perceived hostility of the
Court to Reconstruction goals, evidenced by the Court's contempo-
raneous decisions, and as a determination that the Court should not
be trusted with the primary role in protecting Fourteenth Amend-
ment rights.° Further, evidence from the immediate post-
Amendment legislative record makes it clear that Congress itself did
39 Id. at 178-81.
4° See Soifer, supra note 1, at 490 ("The [Boerne] majority invoked ' [s]cholars of succes-
sive generations' but relied on nothing published later than 1966.").
41 see id.
42 Richard L. Aynes, Unintended Consequences of the Fourteenth Amendment, in UNIN-
TENDED CONSEQUENCES OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 110, 123 (David E. Kyvig ed.,
2000); see Soifer, supra note 1, at 485.
43
 See TRIBE, supra note 27, § 7-2, at 1299; Earl Warren, Fourteenth Amendment: Retrospect
and Prospect, in Ts-rE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 212, 216 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1970).
44 Warren, supra, note 43, at 216.
43 Id. {emphasis added). But see McConnell, supra note 1, at 174 ("The supporters of
the Fourteenth Amendment never seriously entertained the 'substantive' interpretation of
Section Five . . . .") •
46 See Caminker, supra note 1, at 1163; McConnell, supra note 1, at 182; Soifer, supra
note 1, at 486. The framers were especially angry about recent decisions such as Dred Scott
v. Sandford that threatened Reconstruction's goals. McConnell, supra note 1, at 182; Soifer,
supra note 1, at 486.
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uncleist:ind its i4ile mulct the Fourteenth Amendment as merely
lug itidi( iallv defined tights. 47
In addition to designing a special role for Congress, the Amend-
ment's drafters also intended to dramatically alter the balance of
power between the federal and state governments.° Before Recon-
struction, the states were the primary guarantors of individuals' liber-
ties; after the Fourteenth Amendment, constitutional rights were na-
tionalized.° As part of the balance shift, the drafters empowered
Congress to protect fundamental rights against infringement by states
and even, some have suggested, private individuals." Even so, the
Court has not always seen fit to afford Congress such an expansive
role.51 Beginning in 1883 with its Civil Rights Cases decision, the Court
limited the scope of the Section 5 power by declaring that Congress
cannot directly regulate the actions of private actors." The Court
concluded that the legislation in question had impermissibly altered
the balance of power between the federal government and the
states." The Court reached this conclusion even though there is solid
evidence that the Fourteenth Amendment's framers intended such a
shift.54
Despite its early resistance to the Fourteenth Amendment's
equality guarantees, the Court eventually, with Congress's help, began
42 McConnell, supra note 1, at 175, 176 ("Between 1866 and 1875, Congress engaged
in extensive debates over the substantive reach of the various Reconstruction era Civil
Rights Acts.... All of these claims followed from the congressmen's own readings of the
Constitution, without reference to judicial construction.").
45 CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU, THE INTENDED SIGNIFICANCE OF TIIE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 377-85 (1997); Post & Siegel, supra note 1, at 512; see Soifer, supra note 1, at
493 ("Contemporary federalism claims almost surely would have greatly surprised sup-
porters of ... the Fourteenth Amendment. Deference to the states was hardly the lesson
that the [framers] drew from a gruesome war fought in large measure exactly to defeat
states' rights claims.").
°McConnell, supra note 1, at 192-93; Warren, supra note 43, at 220.
14 See ANTtEiku , supra note 48, at 385.
Si Warren, supra note 43, at 216.
52 See 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883); Warren, supra note 43, at 219. According to former Chief
Justice Warren, the state action limitation was 'unnecessary and unjustified" and wounded
the Fourteenth Amendment at its heart. Warren, supra note 43, at 220. It was unjustified
because Section 5 purposefully expanded national power at the expense of the state
power. Id. Furthermore, under a conception of legal protection, the states had an
affirmative duty to provide protection to its citizens equally, and Congress had the power
to step in with federal legislation if the states neglected this duty. Id. at 221; see Soifer, supra
note 1, at 485.
53 See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11.
H See Cam hiker, supra note 1, at 1190; Warren, supra note 43, at 220.
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to fulfill the Amendment's promises. 55 Following the early civil rights
cases of the 1950s, "the Court established a relationship with Congress
that was fluid and dynamic."56 The Court learned from Congress the
people's understanding of what American equality norms should be."
This interbranch give and take "enabled the Court to interpret the
Equal Protection Clause in a manner that was attentive to evolving
and contested social norms."5$ The Court's present insistence that it
retain primary, perhaps exclusive, control over the Amendment's sub-
stantive guarantees represents a dramatic change from the old work-
ing relationship." The current uncertainty surrounding the federal
role in combating discrimination suggests, in part, a shift in the na-
ture of the relationship between Congress and the Court."
II. BOERNE AND ITS PROGENY: THE COURT'S CONTEMPORARY
APPROACH TO THE SECTION 5 POWER
A. City of Boerne v. Flores: The Court's Handmade Requirements,
Congruence and Pmportionality, Defeat RFRA
In 1997, in City of Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court of the
United States dramatically curtailed Congress's power under Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment to remedy and prevent discrimina-
tion.61 Boerne arose as a challenge to the Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act of 1993 (RFRA), a direct legislative response to a recent
Court holding. 62 Through RFRA, Congress explicitly attempted to re-
verse the holding in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources
v. Smith, that neutral, generally applicable laws may be applied to re-
ligious practices without violating the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment, even when not supported by a compelling governmen-
tal interest." The plaintiff in Boerne, the Archbishop of San Antonio,
sued under RFRA for relief from a municipality's refusal to issue a
building permit to a church that was burdened by a historic preserves
55
 Post & Siegel, supra note 1, at 446.
56 Id.
57 Id.
la Id.
" See Hart, supra note 5, at 1108-10.
6° See Post & Siegel, supra note 1, at 446.
61 See 521 U.S. 507, 512 (1997).
" See id. at 514-15.
Id.
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tion regulation. 64 The United States District Court for the Western
District of Texas concluded that, by applying RFRA to state statutes,
Congress exceeded its power under Section 5.65 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding RFRA consti-
tutional.66 The Supreme Court, in turn, reversed. 67
The Court in Boerne addressed the issue of whether RFRA as ap-
plied to the states was a proper exercise of Congress's Section 5 power
to enforce by appropriate legislation the guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment.66
 The Court initially observed that Section 5 is a positive
grant of legislative power to Congress. 69 The Court explained that
"twlhatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the
objects the amendments have in view . . . is brought within the do-
main of congressional power."" Furthermore, Congress is empowered
to enact legislation that deters or remedies constitutional violations
even if, in so doing, it prohibits conduct that is not itself unconstitu-
tional."
Nevertheless, focusing on the text of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the Court in Boerne emphasized the remedial nature of the Sec-
tion 5 power." The power, the Court stated, extends only to enforcing
the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, not to decreeing the
Amendment's substance." Emphatically, the Court declared that
"Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what
the right is."74 The power to determine what constitutes a constitu-
tional violation, then, does not belong to Congress." Furthermore,
although the line between remedial measures and those that make a
substantive change in the governing law is difficult to discern, it is a
distinction that must be observed." Famously, the Court determined
that "[t]here must be a congruence and proportionality between the
injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that
64 Id. at 512.
66 Id.
66 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512.
67 Id.
65 Id. at 517.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 517-18 (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339,345-46 (1879)).
71 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518.
7s Id. at 519.
73 Id.
74 11,
76 Id.
76 See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519-20.
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end. Lacking such a connection, legislation may become substantive
in operation and effect."" The courts' role in evaluating legislation
enacted under Section 5, then, is to police the line between remedy
and substance."
The Court in Boerne justified its conclusion that the nature of the
Section 5 power is remedial rather than substantive by pointing to two
historical and structural issues: federalism and separation of powers."
According to Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, the drafters of
the Fourteenth Amendment specifically rejected a draft amendment
submitted by Representative John Bingham of Ohio, which would
have given Congress, some believed, too much power at the expense
of the existing federal constitutional structure." Under the revised
amendment, Justice Kennedy observed, Congress's power against the
states was "no longer plenary but remedial."81 Moreover, the drafters
designed the amendment to respect the traditional separation of
powers between the legislative and judicial branches. 82 Although the
Bingham proposal had given Congress the primary power to interpret
and elaborate on the meaning of the amendment through legislation,
the amendment as adopted maintained the Court's primary authority
to interpret its prohibitions."
The Court's precedents confirmed that Congress's enforcement
power was merely remedial and preventive, Justice Kennedy noted,
relying especially on the Civil Rights Cases." Additionally, he con-
cluded, the Court's more recent holdings did not disturb the Court's
consistent requirement that measures enacted under the Section 5
power be remedial.85 For example, in 1966, in Katzenbach v. Morgan,
the Court upheld the constitutionality of section 4(e) of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, which prohibited a New York state literacy re-
" Id. at 520.
78 See id. at 519-20.
75 See id. at 520-24.
815 Id. at 520-21.
81 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 522.
82 Id. at 523-24.
Id. at 524.
' Id. (construing the Civil Rights Cases decision, 109 U.S. 3 (1883)). Professor Soifer
disapproves of the Court's reliance on the Civil Rights Cases decision, arguing that "the
Boerne Court's egregious use of the Civil Rights Cases as its key precedent, and the insistent
exclusivity of its proclamation about constitutional wisdom ... ate mi Wag ativiiiim to
knock tnost of the pieces off the !Wald." Soifer. Juin a mar 1.41 I9I
85 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 525-26 (t mot uing South (..uolana katicillt.ta 11. VA1 t %
301 (1966)).
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quirement for certain Puerto Rican voters, even though the Court
had previously determined that literacy requirements were constitu-
tionally permissible." Justice Kennedy acknowledged that Morgan
could be read to recognize "a power in Congress to enact legislation
that expands the rights contained in Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment."" Nevertheless, he stated, such a reading was not neces-
sary or "best;" rather, Morgan could and should be read as the Court's
having "perceived a factual basis on which Congress could have con-
cluded that [the] literacy requirement 'constituted an invidious dis-
crimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.'"" Such a
narrow reading was preferable, Justice Kennedy reasoned, to protect
the Constitution's role as "superior paramount law, unchangeable by
ordinary means," as it would be if it were a mere legislative enact-
ment."
Turning to consider RFRA's application to the states, the Court
examined the fit between the means used by the Act and the per-
ceived constitutional injuries." The Court noted that "[t]he appro-
priateness of remedial measures must be considered in light of the
evil presented. Strong measures appropriate to address one harm may
be an unwarranted response to another, lesser one."91 First, the Court
examined the legislative record for modern examples of generally
applicable laws passed because of religious bigotry." The Court found
no modern instances of such legislation, noting that none had oc-
curred within the past forty years: 93 Furthermore, the Court observed,
RFRA was completely out of proportion to any "supposed remedial or
preventive object," such that it could not be understood as anything
but an attempt to change the substance of constitutional rights.94
99 See id. at 518,528.
97 Id. at 527-28.
98 Id. at 528 (quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641,656 (1966)). Former Chief
Justice Warren viewed Morgan quite differently; he called the decision "a major step toward
removing the restrictions that the Civil Rights Casa had imposed on congressional en-
forcement power" that "told Congress that it shared with the court the responsibility for
construing and applying the provisions" of the Fourteenth Amendment. Warren, supra
note 43, at 227.
99 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 529 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
177 (1803)).
9° Id. at 530.
91 Id.
92 Id.
" Id.
94 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532.
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RFRA's sweeping reach and scope, the Court determined, were far
broader than any perceptible "mischief and wrong" Congress could
have meant to prevent or remedy." In sum, RFRA lacked the congru-
ence and proportionality required of Section 5 legislation and was
therefore invalid as applied to the states. 96
The dissenters in Boerne largely focused on their belief that the
Court's decision in Smith was erroneous; only Justice O'Connor
specifically addressed the issue of Congress's Section 5 power." Justice
O'Connor largely agreed with the Court's reasoning about the Sec-
tion 5 power." She was even more explicit about Congress's institu-
tional limitations, arguing that "Din short, Congress lacks the ability
to define or expand the scope of constitutional rights by statute.""
She noted that this fact did not detract from Congress's duty to draw
its own conclusions regarding the Constitution's meaning, but in so
doing, Congress must make such conclusions consistent with the
Court's exposition of the Constitution.""
Boerne was ari exceptional case in part because RFRA was an ex-
plicit attempt by Congress legislatively to overrule a politically un-
popular decision of the Court."' Some of the Court's language in
Boerne reflects the Court's having interpreted RFRA as a direct institu-
tional affront:
When the political branches of the Government act against
the background of a judicial interpretation of the Constitu-
tion already issued, it must be understood that in later cases
and controversies the Court will treat its precedents with the
respect due them under settled principles, including stare de-
this, and contrary expectations must be disappointed.'"
Because of the unusual circumstances surrounding the Boerne deci-
sion, one might have thought that its application and utility would be
95 See id.
" Id. at 533,536.
97 See id. at 544-65 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 565-66 (Souter, J., dissenting); id.
at 566 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
98 Id. at 545 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
99 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 545 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
199 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Hil See id. at 512-15.
199
 See id. at 536.
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fairly limited. 10 Nevertheless, the Court applied the Boerne test four
times over the next four years, demonstrating the enduring impact of
its new approach.'"
B. Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents: Congress Prohibits Too Much State
Action in the ADEA?
Three years after &erne, the Court faced Section 5 legislation
that, unlike RFRA, did not deliberately attempt to enlarge substantive
rights beyond the Court's definition. 105 In 2000, in Kimel v. Florida
Board of Regents, the Supreme Court relied on Boerne in invalidating a
portion of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(ADEA), which prohibited employers, including states, from dis-
criminating against individuals because of age. 106
 Justice O'Connor's
opinion for the Court focused on the ADEA's private suit provision, as
applied to the states, which required Congress validly to abrogate the
states' sovereign immunity through use of its Section 5 power. 1 °7 After
it first determined that Congress explicitly intended to abrogate
states' sovereign immunity under the ADEA, the Court then con-
los See id. at 512-15; see also McConnell, supra note 1, at 174 ("[T] he Boerne majority
viewed congressional action as an irrelevance, if not an impertinence."); Post & Siegel,
supra note 1, at 454 ("In Boerne, the Court was plainly provoked . . ."); Soifer, supra note I,
at 489 ("[T]he Court felt obliged ... to rebuff emphatically what the Justices perceived to
he Congress's intrusion onto turf the Court had staked out exclusively for itself.").
101 See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365-74 (2001); United States
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 665 (2000); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 63-64
(2000); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 630
(1999).
105 See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 66. Unlike the circumstances surrounding RFRA, the ADEA
was enacted prior to the Court's having defined the contours of age discrimination. See id.;
Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976) (applying rationality review to sustain
mandatory retirement age for state troopers).
106 528 U.S. at 66.
107 Id. at 68, 73. The Eleventh Amendment states: "The Judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prose-
cuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Sub-
jects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend XI. This amendment has long been under-
stood to mean that federal courts lack jurisdiction over suits by private parties against
nonconsenting states. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 73. In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, the Court
held that Congress cannot abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity tin-
der its Article I powers, such as the Commerce Clause. 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996). Never-
theless, Congress can abrogate states' sovereign immunity through legislation validly en-
acted under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 80.
710	 Boston College Law Review
	
[Vol. 43:697
eluded that the ADEA was not appropriate legislation under Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 108
The Court in Kimel began by reiterating its approach in Boerne. 10
Justice O'Connor recognized that Section 5 is a positive grant of
power to Congress, but, nevertheless, one with inherent limitations. 110
Although Congress can remedy and deter violations of rights guaran-
teed by the Fourteenth Amendment by prohibiting "a somewhat
broader swath of conduct, including that which is not itself forbidden
by the Amendment's text," it cannot independently determine what
constitutes a constitutional violation.111 To ensure that Congress does
not cross the decidedly fine line between appropriate remedial legis-
lation and inappropriate substantive redefinition of rights, a court
examining legislation must find congruence and proportionality be-
tween the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted
to that end. 112
Applying the congruence and proportionality test to the ADEA,
Justice O'Connor determined that the Act was invalid in trumping
state immunity. 113 First, she observed, its provisions targeted a dispro-
portionate level of "unconstitutional conduct." 114 Because age is not a
suspect classification under the Court's equal protection analysis, it
followed, according to Justice O'Connor, that states are not constitu-
tionally required to tailor narrowly their age distinctions to legitimate
interests. 115 In fact, states need only have a rational, basis for drawing
lines on the basis of age to satisfy the Constitution. 116 Because states
are allowed to discriminate byage if they have a rational basis for do-
ing so, the ADEA provision was out of proportion to a supposed re-
medial or preventive object.'" Justice O'Connor emphasized that the
ADEA's broad restriction on the use of age as a discriminating factor
108 Kimel, 528 U.S. at 74, 82-83. To determine whether Congress has abrogated states'
sovereign immunity, the Court applies a two.part test: first, did Congress unequivocally
express its intent to abrogate that immunity; second, if it did, did Congress act pursuant to
a valid grant of constitutional authority? Id. at 73 (citing Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S. at
55).
109 Id. at 80-82.
10 Id. at 80-81.
in Id. at 81.
"2 id.
]I3 Kime4 528 U.S. at 82-83.
Id. at 83.
115 Id.
1 16 Id. at 86.
117 Id.
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lrr ohihiled trihalovtfialll	 contiticil than would lie held
stual under the Com t'‘ equal protection, rational basis stanclard. 118
. 1 he AMA's increased burden on state employers was more like a
strict scrutiny standard, the Court reasoned, a more stringent stan-
dard than the Court applies in adjudicating an Equal Protection claim
based on age classifications. 119
Besides prohibiting "very little conduct likely to be held unconsti-
tutional," the provision of the ADEA also failed because it was not rea-
sonably prophylactic.'" To determine whether the ADEA was appro-
priately prophylactic or "merely an attempt to substantively redefine
the States' legal obligations with respect to age discrimination," the
Court examined the ADEA's legislative record to identify the basis on
which Congress might have decided there was a "difficult and intrac-
table problem[]" requiring a robust remedy.' 21
 The Court found that,
on the contrary, the ADEA was "an unwarranted response to a per-
haps inconsequential problem."122 Congress identified no pattern of
age discrimination by state employers, Justice O'Connor observed,
only "isolated sentences clipped from floor debates and legislative re-
ports."'" As a result, the Court concluded, Congress had insufficient
reason to believe that states were unconstitutionally discriminating
against employees on the basis of age and thus insufficient reason to
enact such a harsh remedy as the ADEA. 124
C. United States v. Morrison: VAWA Fails for Lack of State Action
In 2000, in United States v. Morrison, the Supreme Court followed
Boerne in striking down the civil remedy provided by the Violence
Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA). 125 The VAWA was enacted to
combat perceived inadequate state remedies, including prosecution,
for violent crimes motivated by gender. 126 The Court in Morrison, after
first determining that Congress lacked power to enact the private
it" Kimel„ 528 U.S. at 86.
In Id. at 87-88.
Ito Id. at 88.
121 Id.
In Id.
rte Kimel, 528 U.S. at 89.
rrM Id. at 91.
125 529 U.S. at 602.
126 Id. at 619-20.
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damage suit provision of the VAWA under the Commerce Clause,
considered Congress's power to enact it under Section 5. 127
ChiefJustice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, began the Section
5 analysis in the same way as did the Court in Boerne and Kimel, by ac-
knowledging Congress's authority and then observing its limita-
tions. 128 The Court then laid out the manner in which it would ana-
lyze a gender discrimination problem under the Equal Protection
Clause; it noted that state-sponsored gender discrimination violates
Equal Protection unless it serves important governmental objectives
through means that are substantially related to the fulfillment of
those objectives.'" Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that gender
classifications trigger heightened scrutiny by the Court, but also ob-
served that the Court's Equal Protection analysis does not reach pri-
vate individuals because the Clause requires state action.'" The ab-
sence of state action proved fatal to the VAWA's private suit
provision. 131 Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that the Act was not a
congruent and proportional prophylactic measure because it was "di-
rected not at any State or state actor, but at individuals who have
committed criminal acts'motivated by gender bias." 132 The Court was
not convinced of the Act's remedial nature despite the alleged failure
of state actors to enforce the law adequately because of their gender
bias.'"
In dissent, Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Stevens for discussion
of Section 5, primarily disagreed with the Court's narrow Commerce
Clause analysis. 134 Nevertheless, Justice Breyer did briefly register his
doubts regarding the Court's reasoning in rejecting Congress's power
under Section 5 to enact the VAWA's private suit provision.' Al-
though Justice Breyer agreed with the Court that Section 5 does not
empower Congress to remedy purely private conduct, he reminded
the Court that the government's argument in the case was that the
131 Id. at 619. The VAWA was not a proper use of the Commerce Clause because it con-
cerned noneconomic conduct. Id. at 617-18.
126 Id. at 619.
133 Id. at 620.
130 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 621.
131
 Id. at 626-27.
133 Id. at 626.
133 See id. at 624-25.
154 See it at 655-66 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
156 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 664 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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VAWA was a remedy for the (in)actions of state actors. 156 Moreover,
Justice Breyer asked rhetorically, "[W]lly can Congress not provide a
remedy against private actors?" 157 Even though private actors had not
themselves violated the Constitution, under the Court's Section 5
analysis, Congress is empowered "at least sometimes" to enact reme-
dial legislation that prohibits conduct that is not itself unconstitu-
tional. 135 Because the VAWA intruded little upon states or private par-
ties, Justice Breyer asked, "Why is the remedy `disproportionate'?" 132
Given the close relationship between the injury (inadequate state
remedies) and the remedy (a federal forum), Justice Breyer asked,
"[W]here is the lack of 'congruence?" 146 Justice Breyer believed the
VAWA was properly enacted under the Commerce Clause, and left
these probing questions regarding Congress's Section 5 power unan-
swered."'
D. Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett: ADA's
Remedies Too Stringent
In 2001, in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett,
the Supreme Court invalidated provisions of the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act of 1990 (ADA) that allowed for recovery of money dam-
ages against the states. 142 The ADA prohibited certain employers, in-
cluding states, from discriminating in employment against qualified
individuals with disabilities and required employers to make reason-
able accommodations for employees with disabilities. 145 The Court
faced a similar issue as in Kimel: to abrogate the states' sovereign im-
munity effectively, the ADA must have been validly enacted under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.l`u
In its most explicit terms to date, the Court expounded upon the
contours of Congress's Section 5 power."5 The Court observed that
"Congress is not limited to mere legislative repetition of this Court's
193 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
In Id. at 665 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
1S8 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518; Morgan, 384 U.S. at
651; South Carolina u Katumbach, 383 U.S. at 308).
179 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
145
 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 665 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
141 Id. at 666 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
142 531 U.S. at 360. ,
143 Id. at 361.
1B Id. at 364.
115 See id. at 365.
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constitutional jurisprudence."146 Rather, Congress retains a narrow
window of authority whereby it can remedy and prevent violation of
rights by prohibiting conduct that is not itself a violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment"? Congress can enact Section 5 legislation
"reaching beyond Section 1's actual guarantees" when the legislation
exhibits congruence and proportionality between the injury to be
prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end. 145
The Court then followed its now familiar process of analyzing the
legislation. 149
 First, the Court outlined the scope of the constitutional
right at issue—here, the states' treatment of the persons with disabili-
ties. 15° By looking at its own precedents on this point, the Court ob-
served that classifications involving disability trigger only rational basis
review. 151 As such, states can, without violating Section 1 of the Four-
teenth Amendment, discriminate against individuals with disabilities if
there is a rational relationship between the disparate treatment and a
legitimate governmental purpose. 152 Second, the Court examined the
legislative record to see "whether Congress identified a history and
pattern of unconstitutional employment discrimination by the States
against the disabled." 153 The Court concluded that Congress's general
finding of systematic societal discrimination against individuals with
disabilities did not explicitly implicate enough discrimination by the
states. 1" The Court noted that the Respondents' brief cited "half a
dozen examples" of relevant discrimination by the states. 155 Further,
the record's most blatant examples of state discriinination were drawn
from years long past. 155 Even if, in aggregate, the examples were
found to be unconstitutional, they would not, the Court concluded,
146 Id.
147 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365.
145 Id.
149 See id. at 366-67.
15° Id.
151 Id. at 366 (construing Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)). De-
spite Chief Justice Rehnquist's emphatic statement that the Court, in Cleburne, had em-
ployed mere rational basis review, many observers have concluded that the Court tacitly
applied heightened scrutiny. Mark A. Johnson, Note, Board of Trustees of the University of
Alabama v. Garrett: A Flawed Standard Yields a Predictable Result, 60 MD. L. REV. 393, 410
(2001).
162 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 367.
153
 Id. at 368,
154 See id. at 369.
155 Id.
156 Id. n.6.
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suggest "the pattern of unconstitutional discrimination" that would
empower Congress to enact remedial legislation under Section 5. 157
Furthermore, the Court stated, even if it were to concede a pat-
tern of unconstitutional discrimination by the states, "the rights and
remedies created by the ADA against the States" would raise concerns
as to congruence and proportionality. 158 The ADA was incongruous
and disproportional in three ways: first, it would be rational for states
to discriminate against persons with disabilities for financial reasons,
but the ADA required employers to make reasonable accommoda-
tions; second, only undue hardship triggered the ADA's exception,
but the Court's rational relationship test would impose a lesser duty;
and, third, the employer bore the burden of proving an undue bur-
den under the ADA instead of the employee, as would be true under
the rational basis test. 159 Because the ADA failed the Boerne congru-
ence and proportionality test, it did not validly abrogate the states'
sovereign immunity. 160
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O'Connor, concurred with the
Court in Garrett, writing separately to emphasize the importance of
state sovereignty in the federal system. 161 He noted the seriousness of
accusing a state of "engag[ing] in a pattern or practice designed to
deny its citizens the equal protection of the laws, particularly where
the accusation is based not on hostility but instead on the failure to
act or the omission to remedy."162 He observed that states are "neutral
entities," which are responsible to their own citizens and which do not
violate the Equal Protection Clause merely by failing to revise public
policy to be in step with prevailing opinion. 163 Unequivocally, Justice
Kennedy stated, "The predicate for money damages against an uncon-
senting State in suits brought by private persons must be a federal
statute enacted upon the documentation of patterns of constitutional
violations committed by the State in its official capacity."'" Justice
Kennedy's focus on the importance of federalism issues in the Section
5 context echoes his conclusions in Boerne. 165
157 See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 370.
158 Id. at 372.
IN Id.
ico Id. at 374,
161 See id. at 374-76 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
162 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 375 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
163 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
164 Id. at 376 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
165 See id. at 374-76 (Kennedy, J., concurring); City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520-23.
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Justice Breyer dissented vigorously in Garrett; Justices Stevens,
Souter, and Ginsburg joined him. 166 He accused the majority of
"[r] eviewing the congressional record as if it were an administrative
agency record. "167 Arguing against the level of scrutiny with which the
majority examined the legislative process, Justice Breyer insisted that
Congress reasonably could have concluded that the ADA was an ap-
propriate way to enforce the Equal Protection Clause.'
justice Breyer focused on the differences in institutional capacity
between the courts and Congress. 166 For example, the majority noted
that the evidence before Congress was insufficient to prove in court
that "in each instance, the discrimination they suffered lacked
justification from a judicial standpoint."'" Justice Breyer suggested
that the majority was holding Congress to an improper standard; he
argued, "[A] legislature is not a court of law."'" Congress as an insti-
tution makes its decisions differently from the courts, often relying on
anecdotal or opinion testimony to draw general conclusions.'" The
Court in Garrett, Justice Breyer argued, deviated from its past practice
of looking to the reasonableness of Congress's conclusions rather
than requiring "extensive investigation of each piece of evidence."'"
Justice Breyer found no justification for the majority's heightened
scrutiny in the Section 5 context. 174
According to Breyer, the Court's failure to find sufficient evi-
dence in the legislative record to support the ADA stemmed from its
erroneously holding Congress to judicial standards. 175 Limitations
stemming from the nature of the judicial process, such as burden of
proof, are inapposite when applied to Congress. 176 Indeed, rational
basis review, which had by then condemned the ADA and the ADEA
as invalid Section 5 legislation, inherently presumes constitutionality
and is itself a limitation on judges. 1" The Court's approach to review-
168 See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 376-89 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
169 Id. at 376 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
168 Id. at 377 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
169 Id. at 380-89 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
170 Id. at 379 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
171 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 379-80 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
172 Id. at 380 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
173 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
174 Id. at 380-89 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
199 Id. at 382 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
176 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 383 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
177 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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ing ► ess's riwet mule. Section 5 was flawed, then, because "the
.► ,140 es, of the United States is not a lower court." 178
 The Court
sin add not I equit e Colit.,n .ess to adopt "rules or presumptions" that
reflect a court's institutional capacity. 179 To do so, as the majority did,
according to Justice Breyer, was to stand the principle of judicial re-
straint on its head.'" If the Court had not improperly held Congress
to a judicial standard, it would have found the legislative record more
than adequate. 181
Justice Breyer then analyzed the Court's alternative conclusion by
applying the congruence and proportionality requirements to the
ADA. 182 He observed that the Court had in the past upheld disparate
impact standards in. contexts in which they were not constitutionally
required, even though the perceived excess of the reasonable ac-
commodation requirement bothered the Court here. 183 Justice Breyer
noted that "what is 'reasonable' in the statutory sense and what is 'un-
reasonable' in the constitutional sense might differ. In other words,
the requirement may exceed what is necessary to avoid a constitu-
tional violation."'" That, to Justice Breyer, was exactly the point.'"
Section 5 grants to Congress the power to do that which "'tends to
enforce submission' to its 'prohibitions' and `to secure to all persons
... the equal protection of the laws." 186 It is a power the Court in the
past equated with the authority granted to Congress in the Necessary
and Proper Clause, a broad power. 187 Although the majority's current
approach paid lip service to judicial deference to Congress and pur-
ported to follow that standard, Justice Breyer found nothing of it in
practice in the Court's recent cases.'"
178 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
178 Id. at 384 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
188 Id. at 385 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
181 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 385 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
182 Id. at 385-87 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
183 Id. at 385 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62 (1980)
(plurality opinion); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 172-73 (1980); Washing-
ton v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432
(1971)).
184 Garrett, 531 U.S at 385-86 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
188 See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
186 Id. at 386 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Fa parteVirginia, 100 U.S. at 346).
187 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Morgan, 389 U.S. at 650).
Bs Id. at 386-87 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Kimet, 528 U.S. at 81; Cott San Bank,
527 U.S. at 639; City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536).
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Justice Breyer then took on the majority's primary motivation in
curtailing Congress's Section 5 power: federalism. 199 Justice Breyer
conceded that the ADA imposed a burden on states by abrogating
their sovereign immunity.'" Nevertheless, he observed that "Mules
for interpreting § 5 that would provide States with special protection
.. run counter to the very object of the Fourteenth Amendment."191
The Fourteenth Amendment, then, overrides principles of federalism
that might otherwise be impediments to Congress in enacting correc-
tive legislation. 192
Neither federalism nor the majority's backward separation of
powers arguments satisfied Justice Breyer.'" He doubted "that [the]
decision serves any constitutionally based federalism interest" and ar-
gued that "[t]he Court . . . improperly invades a power that the Con-
stitution assigns to Congress." What is left of the Section 5 power is
but a shell, Justice Breyer concluded: "[Garrett] saps § 5 of independ-
ent force, effectively 'confin [ing] the legislative power . . . to the in-
significant role of abrogating only those state laws that the judicial
branch [is] prepared to adjudge unconstitutional.'" 195 One might in-
fer from Justice Breyer's analysis that all that remains of the Section 5
power is the authority to legislate against latent violations of Section 1,
a power with very dubious independent value.'"
III. A CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF AN FMLA. PROVISION
As previously discussed, the Court's recent Section 5 cases se-
verely restrain Congress's ability to enact federal antidiscrimination
legislation. 197 Yet, after Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v.
Garrett, it is still very unclear what legislation will survive the Court's
new heightened scrutiny of Section 5 measures. 199 Currently, it is clear
that legislation must be congruent and proportional to the constitu-
189 Garrett, 531 U.S at 887-88 (Breyer, J., dissenting),
199 Id. at 388 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
. 191 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
192 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
193 See id. at 876-89 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
194 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 388-89 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
199 Id. at 389 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Morgan, 384 U.S. at 648-49).
1" See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
197 See supra Part II.
I" See Post & Siegel, supra note 1, at 526 ("[TJhe Boerne test could easily invalidate
large stretches of federal antidiscrimination law ....").
2002]	 Antidiscrimination Legislation After Garret 	 719
tional violation to be remedied or prevented. 199 That is, for legislation
to pass the Court's stricter approach, its remedy must be congruent
and proportional to behavior that has previously been found to be a
constitutional violation by a court $00 It would be wrong for this re-
quirement to mean, however, that Congress can only remedy or pre-
vent constitutional violations by specifically outlawing behaviors that
would violate Section J, 201 If that were the case, Section 5 would be
redundant, a dead letter. 202 That interpretation would reduce Con-
gress to the role of federal scrivener, merely codifying prohibitions on
those behaviors federal courts have previously identified as violations
of the Fourteenth Amendment."3
If we accept that Congress has power to protect court-identified
constitutional rights by prohibiting otherwise constitutional behav-
ior—as must be true if Section 5 is to have logical meaning and as the
Court has reiterated—the question remains, when and under what
circumstances?204 At least the following issues are still unresolved: how
much deference the Court will afford to Congress to decide, as a mat-
ter of policy; which means are best suited to accomplishing its goals;
the size of that narrow window wherein Congress can legislate against
otherwise constitutional behavior; and whether the degree of defer-
ence changes and the size of the window expands and contracts in
tandem with the level of scrutiny the Court applies to potential consti-
tutional violations."3
Two United States Courts of Appeals recently addressed these
issues in hearing challenges to a provision of the FMLA; they reached
199
	
of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 565 (2001); Kimel v. Ha. Bd. of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
400
	 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 389 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Caminker, supra note 1, at 1143—
46.
10 ' See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 389 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
"2 See id.
"3 See Estreicher & Lemos, supra note 1, at 115.
204 See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365 ("Congress is not limited to mere repetition of this
Court's constitutional jurisprudence."); Kitnel, 528 U.S. at 81 ("Congress' § 5 power is not
confined to the enactment of legislation that merely parrots the precise wording of the
Fourteenth Amendment.").
205 See Hart, supra note 5, at 1092 ("In its recent Section 5 cases, the Court has sug-
gested that the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of 'equal protection' is
different for different classes of people."); Ray, supra note 14, at 1768-69 (suggesting that
courts allow more deference with more important constitutional rights).
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opposite conclusions.206 In 2000, in Kazmier v. Widmann, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that sec-
tion 2612(a) (1) (C) of the FMLA, which requires employers to pro-
vide leave for employees to care for sick relatives, did not validly abro-
gate state sovereign immunity because it was not validly enacted
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 207 In 2001, in Hibbs v.
Department of Human Resources, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit refused to follow Kazmier and concluded that the
same provision of the FMLA was valid Section 5 legislation."9 This
circuit split very likely could lead the Supreme Court to revisit the
Section 5 issue.299
A. Kazmier v. Widmann: The Fifth Circuit Concludes the Provision Is
Unconstitutional
In Kazmier; the Fifth Circuit laid out a two-part test it derived from
Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents. 21° First, the court gauged the scope of
Congress's potential authority to legislate in this area by identifying
the constitutional right: "Congress's authority is most broad when 'we
require a tight[] fit between [the discriminatory classifications in
question] and the legitimate ends they serve,' as we do with
classifications that are based on race or sex."211 Second, the court ex-
amined the legislative record specifically "to see whether it contains
evidence of actual constitutional violations by the States sufficient to justify
the full scope of the statute's provisions." 212 The court emphasized
that the legislative record must reveal "an identified pattern of actual
constitutional violations by the States" rather than merely the poten-
tial for constitutional violations. 213
206 See Hibbs v. Dep't of Human Res., 273 F.3d 844, 858 (9th Cir. 2001), petition for cert.
filed, 70 U.S.L.W. 3597 (U.S. Mar. 11, 2002) (No. 01-1368); Kazmier v. Widmann, 225 F.3d
519, 526 (5th Cir. 2000).
21" 225 F.3d at 526.
2'30 273 F.3d at 858.
209 See Family and Medical Leave Act: FMLA Ruling 'Diggers Split over States' Immunity from
Suit, supra note 12, at 10.
210 225 F.3d at 524.
211 Id. (quoting Kimel, 528 U.S. at 84).
212 hi.
213 Id. ("The respect that must be accorded the States as independent sovereigns
within our federal system prevents Congress from restraining them from engaging in con-
stitutionally permissible conduct based on nothing more than the mere invocation of per-
ceived constitutional bogeymen.").
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The court in Kazmier identified the constitutional issue as gender
discrimination in employment, concluding that "Congress potentially
has wide latitude under Section 5 to enact broad prophylactic legisla-
tion designed to prevent the States from discriminating on the basis
of sex."214 In spite of this, the court was highly skeptical about whether
preventing gender discrimination was Congress's true intent, noting
that "Congress was responding to findings that private sector employ-
ers frequently discriminate against men in granting leave to provide
family care.. .. [T]he perverse effect of this reverse discrimination
has actually been to push women out of the work force . ."215 Even
so, the Kazmier court acknowledged Congress's potentially great lee-
way for legislating in this area. 216
The Kazmier court concluded, however, that the legislative record
did not reveal the "actual, identified constitutional violations by the
States" that would support broad prophylactic legislation. 217 Notably,
the court concluded that findings of discrimination in granting family
leave from the private sector could not be extrapolated to the public
sector.2" Moreover; evidence in the record regarding parental leave
was "not in the least probative of the question before [the court]." 2"
The FMLA, the court reasoned, was "broad, prophylactic legislation
[because] ... Where is nothing in the Constitution that even closely
approximates either a duty to give all employees up to twelve weeks of
leave per year to care for ailing family members or a right of an em-
ployee to take such leave." 22° As a result, the Fifth Circuit was faced
with what it saw as broad legislation imposing a burden on the states
without an adequate legislative record for support. 221
The Kazmier court refused to credit Congress's express declara-
tion of legislative intent, concluding instead that "the FMLA is not
designed to prevent discrimination at all, but rather is crafted to pro-
vide employees throughout the nation with a substantive statutory
right to take leave from work for family and medical reasons." 222 The
Fifth Circuit clearly attempted to sniff out improper congressional
214 Id. at 525, 526.
215 KazInier, 225 F.Sd at 525.
216 Id. at 526.
217 id,
215 Id.
216 Id. at 531.
2211 Kazmier, 225 F.Sd at 526.
221 Id. at 526, 531.
223 Id. at 532.
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intent by first announcing that the right at issue is gender discrimina-
tion in employment but then proceeding to analyze the right as if it is
the right to take family leave, a right that is not constitutionally guar-
anteed.225
 From this, the Fifth Circuit held that Congress did not en-
act this FMLA provision pursuant to its enforcement power under
Section 5.224
B. Hibbs v. Department of Human Resources: The Ninth Circuit Holds
the Provision Is Valid
In Hibbs, the Ninth Circuit began its analysis in essentially the
same way as the Fifth Circuit had in Kazmier, by defining the constitu-
tional issue as gender discrimination.225 Because state-sponsored gen-
der discrimination receives heightened scrutiny, the court explained,
it produces a rebuttable presumption of unconstitutionality. 228 Even
so, the court acknowledged that the FMLA provision "sweeps more
broadly than the Equal Protection Clause itself' because it does not
merely prohibit gender discrimination in the granting of medical
leave.221
 Nevertheless, that fact was not fatal, according to the Ninth
Circuit, because Congress can enact reasonably prophylactic legisla-
tion under Section 5.228
In determining whether gender discrimination in employment is
the type of "difficult and intractable problem ti that would justify such
broad remedies," the Hibbs court rejected the argument that judges
should look only to the legislative record for adequate support. 229
Rather, the court concluded, the legislative record was only one
source of information by which a court could "determine whether the
broad prophylactic legislation under consideration is justified by the
225 See id. at 525, 526.
224 Id. at 526.
225 See Hibbs, 273 F.3d at 854.
226 Id. at 855.
227 Id. at 856.
228 Id.
229 Id. at 856-57 (concluding that looking only at legislative record would he In effect
requiring that Congress gather and document sufficient evidence to support the exercise
of its constitutionally granted powers [and] would raise fundamental separation of powers
concerns—the courts would be treating Congress more like an administrative agency than
like a co-equal branch of the federal government."); cf. Colker & Brudney, supra note 1, at
108 (The Court [in Kilned] used the phrase 'one means' to describe this inquiry, but [the
legislative record] was, in fact, the only means used to assess whether AREA extension was
reasonably prophylactic legislation.").
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existence of sufficiently difficult and intractable problems." 2" The
court considered the legislative record, discriminatory state employ-
ment laws, previous attempted federal antidiscrimination legislation,
and Supreme Court precedent in concluding that gender discrimina-
tion in employment is the type of difficult constitutional problem that
deserves broad legislative remedies. 231
The Hibbs court then concluded that section 2616(a) (1) (C) was
validly enacted Section 5 legislation. 2?2
 First, the court reasoned that,
because the FMLA involves gender discrimination, it is presumptively
constitutional; therefore, the burden shifts to the challenger to prove
that states have not engaged in pervasive unconstitutional conduct?"
Second, the court recognized that there is a long history of invidious
gender discrimination by the states, unlike the situations in Kimel and
Garrett. 2M Thus, because the defendants failed to show that there was
neither a pattern of state-sponsored gender discrimination in grant-
ing family leave nor an historical record of enforcing gender stereo-
types, the FMLA was valid Section 5 legislation.255
In the alternative, the court concluded that even if it looked
solely at the legislative record (a position the court rejected), that re-
cord contained enough evidence of pervasive gender discrimination
in granting family leave to state employees to support the FMLA as
reasonable prophylactic legislation.?" The court expressly noted that
2" Hibbs, 273 E3d at 857.
231 Id. at 858-64. The court wrote:
Although the FMLA's legislative history does not specifically recount this
background, as we hold above, when our nation's judicial history already
documents unconstitutional discrimination against the class at issue, there is
no need for Congress, separately and redundantly, to provide detailed
findings of such discrimination in order to exercise its Fourteenth Amend-
ment powers.
Id. at 869.
x32
 Id. at 858, 860, 871. The court offered three distinct rationales, but this Note will
discuss only the first two, See id. at 858, 860. The third rationale, that the FMLA provision
was a proper remedy for past gender discrimination, while persuasive, is beyond the scope
of this Note. See id. at 860-71.
333
 Id. at 857-58.
234 Id. at 858 (citing Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83) ("persons who suffer discrimination on the
basis of gender have been 'subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment'"). Un-
der the Ninth Circuit's third rationale for upholding this provision of the FMLA, the court
recounted a lengthy historical record of state-sponsored gender discrimination. Id. at 861-
64.
235 Hibbs, 273 E3d at 858.
236 Id. at 858-59.
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heightened scrutiny of gender discrimination impacted its analysis,
explaining that "courts have more latitude in drawing inferences from
the legislative history of, a federal statute aimed at remedying state-
sponsored gender discrimination than in drawing inferences from the
histories of statutes like the ADA and the ADEA, which aim to remedy
discrimination with respect to nonsuspect classifications. " 227 The court
credited evidence of widespread gender discrimination by private sec-
tor employers and testimony that public sector policies are similar to
private sector policies in determining that unconstitutional state-
sponsored gender discrimination is "significant" and "widespread." 2"
The court acknowledged that the evidence in the legislative record
related specifically to parental leave, but it reasoned that such indica-
tors "constitute strong circumstantial evidence of state-sponsored
gender discrimination in the granting of leave to care for a sick family
member, because if states discriminate along gender lines regarding
the one kind of leave, then they are likely to do so regarding the
other."2" Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit sustained the family leave pro-
vision of the FMLA on the basis of its legislative record as well, a rec-
ord the Fifth Circuit had found grossly inadequate. 24°
IV. THE SCOPE AND REACH OF SECTION 5 POWER
The line of cases from City of Boerne v. Flores to Board of Trustees of
the University of Alabama v. Garrett, plots the Court's new course for
evaluating the appropriateness of Section 5 legislation that attempts
to abrogate states' sovereign immunity."' That new course involves
evaluating the legislation's congruence and the proportionality be-
tween the remedy provided and the injury to be prevented. 242 First,
the Court identifies the scope of the constitutional right Congress
seeks to protect through legislation. 243
 Second, the Court examines its
own precedents to determine the level of review a court would use to
identify a constitutional violation; this quantifies the amount of possi-
2" Id. at 859-60.
238
 Id. at 859.
"9 Id.
24* Hibbs, 273 F.3d at 860; Kazmier, 225 F.3d at 526.
241 See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365-74 (2001); United States
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 665 (2000); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 63-64
(2000); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 630
(1999); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512 (1997).
242 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81; City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
245 See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 366-67; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83.
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ble unconstitutional conduct in which states could be engaging. 244
Third, the Court examines the legislative record as one means of de-
termining the state conduct Congress is addressing. 245 The Court de-
cides whether there is a specific history and pattern of recent conduct
that would be judged unconstitutional by a court and whether that
specific conduct is targeted by the legislation. 246
 If the conduct pro-
hibited by Congress would also be considered a violation of Section 1
by a court, then the measure is appropriate Section 5 legislation. 247 If
not, a very small window of constitutional conduct may still be prohib-
ited as a prophylactic means of preventing future constitutional viola-
tions. 2" If Congress targets constitutional conduct outside of that
small window, however, the measure attempts a substantive
redefinition of rights and is therefore not appropriate Section 5 legis-
lation,249
The Boerne-Garrett line of cases represents the Court's clear at-
tempt to diminish Congress's power under Section 5.250
 The Boerne
test unduly restricts Congress's choice of both ends and means. 251
 Le-
gitilnate ends of Congress's Section 5 power are those state actions
that a court itself would adjudge to be violations of Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment; this is what is meant by "congruence."252
This limitation defies the Framers' intent that Congress, not the
Court, would play the primary role in protecting Fourteenth
244 See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 366; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 620; Kime4 528 U.S. at 83.
"5 See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368; Kime4 528 U.S. at 88-89; see also Colker Brudney, supra
note 1, at 105-07 (arguing that requiring Congress to provide adequate legislative record
is like forcing Congress to use a crystal ball to predict the Court's conclusions when enact-
ing legislation).
246 See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368; Kime4 528 U.S. at 89; City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530.
247
 See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 89; City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530.
24B
	 Kime4 528 U.S. at 88-89; City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532; TRIBE, supra note 27, § 5-
16, at 959-60. Professor Tribe writes:
Stepping back momentarily from City of Boerne and subsequent cases, one can
say that Katzenbach v. Morgan and all its progeny, spanning nearly 34 years by
the turn of the century, have now settled beyond question that, in order to
enforce § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress may, acting pursuant to
§ 5, outlaw practices that are not themselves violations of § 1 in any sense—
provided one can show that outlawing those practices is a rational way to
deter or to remedy actions that would violate § 1.
TRIBE, supra note 27, § 5-16, at 959-60.
249 See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 89; City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532.
250 See Camissker, supra note 1, at 1129.
253 Id. at 1143-47.
252 Id. at 1144, 1153-54.
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Amendment rights through a degree of independent definitional
power.255
The Boerne test also unjustifiably restricts Congress's choice of
means to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. 254
 The Court's current
approach departs from its traditional method of evaluating Congress's
legislative power, the one pronounced in McCulloch v. Maryland. 255
Under McCulloch, the Court defers to Congress's choice of means so
long as it is "plainly adapted" or "conducive" to a legitimate end. 256
The Court does not independently evaluate the prudence of Con-
gress's choice, preferring instead to credit its legislative judgment. 257
Further, the Court does not independently assess the degree of the
problem to be solved or the need for legislation in the first place. 258
The Court followed this deferential approach in the Section 5
context until the Boerne line of cases. 259 Katzenbach v. Morgan typifies
the Court's approach before Boerne.26° In Morgan, voters in New York
City challenged the constitutionality of section 4(e) of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, which prohibited states' use of literacy as a pre-
requisite to voting when the voter had successfully completed sixth
grade in a public or accredited private school in Puerto Rico. 261 Al-
though the Court had previously held that literacy requirements do
not always violate the Fourteenth Amendment, the Morgan Court
concluded that section 4(e) was a proper exercise of Congress's Sec-
tion 5 power.262
 The Attorney General of New York urged the Court to
conclude that Congress could only exercise its enforcement power
under Section 5 against a state when the judiciary determines that the
state has violated the provision of the Amendment that Congress
seeks to enforce. 263 Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, disagreed
253 See id. at 1163; Warren, supra note 43, at 216.
254 Caminker, supra note 1, at 1146-47.
255 Id. at 1143.
256 Id. at 1139-43; Estreicher & Lemos, supra note 1, at 118.
257 Caminker, supra note 1, at 1136.
258 Id.
239
	 at 1143.
260
 See 384 U.S. 641, 641 (1966); see also Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 454-56
(1976); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879); cf. City of Rome v. United States, 446
U.S. 156, 179 (1980) (interpreting Fifteenth Amendment's similar enforcement clause);
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324 {1966) {same).
26' Morgan, 384 U.S. at 643.
262 Id. at 646, 699 (citing Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45
(1959)).
255 Id. at 648.
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and concluded that “[n]either the language nor history of § 5 sup-
ports such a construction," noting that the Attorney General's con-
struction "would depreciate both congressional resourcefulness and
congressional responsibility for implementing the Amendment. " 2"
Given that New York's literacy requirement was not per se uncon-
stitutional, the Court asked whether the legislation could still be ap-
propriate to enforce the Equal Protection Clause.265
 To answer that
question, the Court laid out the reach of the Section 5 power, the
breadth of which it equated with the congressional power announced
in McCulloch.266 Applying the McCulloch test to the legislation in ques-
tion, the Court credited what Congress both declared explicitly and
might have believed.267
 Justice Brennan emphasized that
[1] t is not for us to review the congressional resolution of . . .
factors. It is enough that we be able to perceive a basis upon
which the Congress might resolve the conflict as it did . . .
Any contrary conclusion would require us to be blind to the
realities familiar to the legislators. 268
Justice Brennan consistently used deferential language such as "Con-
gress might well have questioned" and "Congress might well have
concluded" to evaluate the factual basis upon which Congress legis-
lated.269
 Notably, only two Justices dissented from the Morgan opin-
ion.2"
This deferential approach makes sense in the constitutional
realm because of the different institutional capacities of Congress and
the Court. 271
 There are many devices that federal courts use in evalu-
ating legislation to limit themselves because they are not part of a
democratic branch of government. 272
 One scholar notes that judicial
I" Id.
266 Id.
266
 Morgan, 384 U.S. at 650.
297 Id. at 653-54.
268
 Id. at 653. This deferential approach is common when the Court evaluates non-
suspect legislation. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483,487-88 (1955).
269 Morgan, 384 U.S. at 654.
270
	 at 659. Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Stewart, argued that Congress had over-
stepped the bounds of its Section 5 power, although he placed considerable emphasis on
the fact that this legislation involved voting, an area of traditional state concern. See id. at
670 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
271 See Garret[, 531 U.S. at 379-85 (Breyer, J., dissenting); McConnell, supra note 1, at
156; Post & Siegel, supra note 1, at 464.
272
 McConnell, supra note 1, at 189.
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restraint "will give elected officials the benefit of the doubt with re-
spect to governmental purpose, will assume facts favorable to the gov-
ernment in assessing effect, will seek to avoid gratuitous conflict with
legislative authority, and will accept reasonable interpretations of the
Constitution that support legislative action."2" These devices do not
define the meaning of the constitutional text; they are tools of judicial
restraint with respect to the states." These judicial standards of deci-
sion-making, which sometimes lead courts to choose less intrusive al-
ternatives, should not apply to Congress, a democratically-elected
branch of government, in its process of decision-making." Further-
more, these judicially imposed constraints should not bind Congress
when it exercises its Section 5 power because they are "predicated on
the need to protect the discretionary judgments of representative in-
stitutions from uncabined judicial interference," and "there is no rea-
son for Congress—the representatives of the people—to abide by
them. Congress need not be concerned that its interpretations . . . will
trench upon democratic prerogatives, because its actions are the ex-
pression of the democratic will of the people." 276 As a result, Congress
should logically be able to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment fully,
without deferring to state judgments as the courts do. 277
The Boerne line of cases, however, clearly diverges from the defer-
ential approach apparent in Morgan.218
 Instead of the traditional ra-
tional relationship test, Section 5 laws are now held to a stricter con-
gruence and proportionality test." The only legitimate means Con-
gress may now use are those that can withstand heightened scrutiny as
narrowly tailored to address unconstitutional conduct—perhaps in-
cluding a small amount of constitutional conduct. 2" This is what is
meant by "proportionality": the magnitude of the remedy must closely
resemble the magnitude of the violation."' The proportionality factor
275 Id.
274 Id.; Post & Siegel, supra note 1, at 464.
275 McConnell, supra note 1, at 156, 189; Post & Siegel, supra note 1, at 464.
276 McConnell, supra note 1, at 156.
277 Id. at 189; Post & Siegel, supra note 1, at 467.
sTS Caminker, supra note 1, at 1143-46; McConnell, supra note 1, at 165.
V9 Kazmier v. Widmann, 225 F.Sd 519, 530 (5th Cir. 2000) ("It could not be clearer
that congruence and proportionality is a considerably more stringent standard of review
than is rational basis."); see Caminker, supra note 1, at 1143-46; McConnell, supra note 1, at
165.
280 Caminker, supra note 1, at 1143-46; McConnell, supra note 1, at 170.
281 Caminker, supra note 1, at 1154.
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• poilio% both quantitative and qualitative elellielils. 2142 The quantita-
ih r dement calculates lu much constitutional conduct the measure
weep• into it'. prohibitions; the more overinclusive a measure is, the
less proportional. 285
 The qualitative element analyzes the nature and
severity of the measure's burden on the states; the greater the burden,
the less likely it is to be proportional. 284
 The Boerne test's searching
inquiry renders the deferential McCulloch approach unrecogniz-
able. 285
 In its choice of both ends and means, Congress's hands are
now tied.286
V. ANALYSIS: CAN THE CIRCUIT COURTS' TREATMENT OF THE FMLA
INFORM WHAT IT MEANS TO BE REASONABLY PROPHYLACTIC?
The Supreme Court, from City of Boerne to Board of Trustees of the
University of Alabama v. Garrett, has transformed the manner in which
Congress can protect individual liberties when it uses its Section 5
power.287
 Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is a positive grant
of power to Congress to enforce the substantive rights Section 1 guar-
antees; it may even be read as granting Congress a degree of inde-
pendent definitional power. 288
 The Amendment's Framers intended
Congress to take a primary role in guaranteeing civil rights nation-
wide through this special enforcement power, regardless of changes in
the accepted federal-state balance.289 Prior to Boerne, the Court had
accorded Congress a great deal of deference in its exercise of Section
5 power, as shown in cases such as Katzenbach v. Morgan. 280
 This former
deference to both legislative ends and means is similar to the Court's
evaluation of legislation passed under other positive grants of power
to Congress since McCulloch v. Maryland. 291
 It also squares with the
different institutional capacities of Congress and the Court that are
relevant in a democratic society. 92
"2 Id.
283 Id. at 1154-55.
284 Id. at 1155.
2" See id. at 1156-58.
299 Caminker, supra note 1, at 1143-46.
07 See supra Part 11.
Res See supra notes 25-47 and accompanying text.
2/19 See supra notes 43-54 and accompanying text.
2" See supra notes 259-270 and accompanying text.
291 See supra notes 259-258 and accompanying text.
292 See supra notes 271-277 and accompanying text.
730	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 43:697
The Court justifies its new approach by appealing to two sets of
values, federalism and separation of powers.295
 The new test, which
evaluates legislation's congruence and proportionality, restricts Con-
gress's choice of both ends and means. 294
 It requires narrow tailoring
between the constitutional injury to be prevented, as federal courts
define that injury, and the legislative remedy. 295
 Nevertheless, there
must still be some window of opportunity in which Congress can act
so' that Section 5 does not become superfluous. 296 After all, the Court
states time after time that Congress can, under Section 5, sometimes
prohibit conduct that is not per se unconstitutional in order to pre-
vent constitutional violations. 297
 It may be that the level of judicial
suspicion the federal legislation's putative beneficiaries raise may de-
termine the size of the window Congress retains in which it may act
without infringing upon separation of powers or federalism con-
cerns. 298
 Even so, the contrasting approaches of the United States
Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Ninth Circuits reveal that how ju-
dicially suspect the beneficiaries are may not be determinative and
that the congruence and proportionality test may serve yet another
role, that of sniffing out judicially disfavored congressional motive
and legislative substance. 29°
The Kazmier v. Widmann and Hibbs v. Department of Human Re-
sources opinions demonstrate that courts can use the congruence and
proportionality test to make sure Congress doesn't improperly invade
the province of the courts or the states, or can use it to invalidate leg-
islation when they disagree with its substance and motivating pur-
pose.30° The courts in Kazmier and Hibbs reached opposite conclusions
about the constitutionality of the FMLA provision at issue primarily
because they applied congruence and proportionality differently to
scrutinize Congress's means and ends."' The Fifth and Ninth Circuits
differed in three basic ways, the sum of which is deference to Con-
293 See supra notes 79-96 and accompanying text; supra notes 189-196 and accompany-
ing text.
294 See supra notes 250-286 and accompanying text.
Rg5 See supra notes 250-286 and accompanying text.
296 See supra notes 197-203 and accompanying text.
See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356,365 (2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd.
of Regents, 528 U.S. 62,81 (2000).
29* Hart, supra note 5, at 1092; Ray, supra note 14, at 1768-69.
299 See supra Part III.A—B.
300 See id.
3°' See id.
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gress: first, how they defined the constitutional right; second, how
they allocated the burden of proof; and third, how they assessed the
role of the legislative record.". The courts' different treatment of
congressional intent exposes the way the congruence and propor-
tionality test can lead courts to view their role in reviewing federal an-
tidiscrimination legislation." It also reveals how a court's fundamen-
tal conception of that role determines how much latitude Congress
has to exercise its constitutionally granted power to enact prophylac-
tic antidiscrimination legislation."
The courts in Kazmier and Hibbs agreed that Congress's stated in-
tent in enacting this portion of the FMLA was to prevent gender dis-
crimination in employment." Nevertheless, the cases characterized
that gender discrimination differently. 506
 Although the Kazmier court
focused narrowly on the issue of gender discrimination in leave-
granting, the Hibbs court broadened the scope somewhat by connect-
ing leave-granting policies to the larger problem of gender discrimi-
nation in employment." The Kazmier court was highly skeptical of
Congress's express intention, namely, remedying gender discrimina-
tion in employment, ultimately concluding that Congress had a dif-
ferent motive in enacting the FMLA." By framing the issue narrowly,
the Kazmier court readily concluded that the FMLA was improper
congressional overreaching; because the Constitution does not re-
quire state employers to grant employees twelve weeks of family leave,
the court reasoned, Congress cannot do so.309
In contrast, the Hibbs court deferred greatly to Congress, willing
to make explicit the connections between employers' family leave
policies, the marginalization of female employees in the way employ-
ers think about them because of leave-taking, and the resultant gen-
305 See id.
"5 See id.
"4 See supra Part II1A—B.
3°5
 Hibbs v. Dep't of Human Res., 273 F.3d 844, 854 (9th Cir. 2001), petition for cert.
filed, 70 U.S.L.W. 3597 (U.S. Mar. 11, 2002) (No. 01-1368); Kazmier v. Widmann, 225 F.3d
519, 525 (5th Cir. 2000).
'al Compare Hibbs, 273 F.3d at 854 ("The United States defends [the provision] on the
ground that it is meant to remedy and prevent unconstitutional gender discrimination.")
with Kazmier, 225 F.3d at 525 ("Congress's express intent in enacting this provision was to
prevent employers from granting [family] leave discriminatorily on the basis of sex.").
"7 See Hibbs, 273 F.3d at 858-60; Kazmier, 225 F.3d at 525.
"8 See Kalinin; 225 F.3d at 525, 532.
309 See id. at 526-27.
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der discrimination in employment. 310
 The Ninth Circuit credited
Congress's conclusion that providing a minimum amount of family
leave for employees on a gender-neutral basis is instrumentally useful
in preventing gender discrimination in employment.311
For the Kazmier court, the FMLA was not an appropriate means of
remedying gender discrimination in employment—discrimination
that would be unconstitutional—because the court rejected those
connections that the Hibbs court explicitly embraced; implicitly, the
Kazmier court found them to be too attenuated. 312 By refusing to
credit those connections, the Kazmier court was able to infer that
Congress's intent in enacting the FMLA was not a proper one—to
prevent unconstitutional gender discrimination—but rather was an
improper one—to grant state employees a substantive benefit. 313
The two courts' treatments of the burden of proof and the legis-
lative record also reveal different ideas about congressional intent. 314
By presuming unconstitutionality, Kazmier in essence assigns to Con-
gress the role of defending the FMLA as appropriate legislation, ap-
parently because of federalism concerns." 5 Hibbs, on the other hand,
approaches the FMLA as presumptively constitutional because it seeks
to prevent gender discrimination and therefore assigns to the defense
the burden of proving that there was no evidence of state-sponsored
gender discrimination before Congress. 316
The two courts also approached the legislative record differ-
ently.317
 The enactment of the FMLA to combat gender discrimina-
tion is key to the analysis because classifications based on gender re-
ceive heightened scrutiny. 315 This differs from Kimel and Garrett
because the City of Boerne test left Congress little room to enact legis-
lation to protect nonsuspect groups or to enforce nonfundamental
rights despite the purported deference to Congress. "S 19 The Hibbs
31 ° See Hibbs, 273 F.3d at 858-60.
311 See id.; see also Post & Siegel, supra note 1, at 457 (asking whether legislative means
used is proximate enough to gender discrimination "to be 'instrumentally useful' in pre-
venting or deterring [unconstitutional] behavior").
512 See Hibbs, 273 F.3d at 858-60; Kazmier, 225 F.3d at 526-27.
313 See Hibbs, 273 F.3d at 858-60; Kazmier, 225 F.3d at 526-27.
314 See Hibbs, 273 F.3d at 858-60; Kazmier, 225 F.3d at 526-27.
313 Kazmier, 225 EM at 524,526.
313 Hibbs, 273 F.3d at 858.
'17 Id. at 858-60; Kaziaies; 225 F.3d at 526.
318 Hibbs, 273 F.3d at 854 (citing United Swirl v. Vitgitti.t. NIM t 1. !)17s. 	 tl.rm.11.
Kazmien 225 F.3cl at 52ti 
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319 Colker & lirticlitty. srrf,ra tior 1. at I 2 I.
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court took this difference seriously. 320 Having already decided that the
FMLA provision was constitutional through its burden-shifting tech-
nique, the Ninth Circuit then concluded, in the alternative, that it was
constitutional because it was supported by an adequate legislative rec-
ord.321 Again, the heightened scrutiny of gender discrimination was
important to the Hibbs court.322 The Hibbs court admitted certain
weaknesses in the legislative record, such as its extrapolation of public
sector behavior from private sector behavior and inference of dis-
crimination in family leave from similar discrimination in parental
leave. 323 Nevertheless, it still found the legislative record adequate be-
cause "courts have more latitude in drawing inferences from the legis-
lative history of a federal statute aimed at remedying state-sponsored
gender discrimination than in drawing inferences from the histories
of statutes like the ADA and the ADEA.' 124 In Kazmier, the Fifth Cir-
cuit gave no such deference to the legislative record. 325
The Kazmier court analyzed the legislative record in almost the
exact same way as the Supreme Court did in Mmel, even though that
case concerned legislation preventing discrimination against older
persons, a non-suspect class, as opposed to women, a quasi-suspect
class. 326 In most cases, state-sponsored age discrimination does not
violate the Fourteenth Amendment; in most cases, state-sponsored
gender discrimination, however, does violate the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 327 Yet, the Fifth Circuit required the FMLA's legislative record
to contain the same pattern of actual constitutional violations by the
states as the Supreme Court did in Kimel and Garrett, even though the
range of possible unconstitutional conduct by the states is much wider
in the area of gender discrimination than in age or disability dis-
crimination. 328
In the end, reasonable minds could decide that the provision of
the FMLA in question is a close case. Nevertheless, "[i] t is precisely in
320 Hibbs, 273 F.3d at 854-60 (concluding that the heightened scrutiny that gender
classifications receive warrants burden shift court employs and greater deference to legisla-
tive record).
321 Id. at 858-60.
322 Id. at 859.
3" See id.
324 Id. at 859-60.
323 See 225 F.3d at 526.
326 See id.
327 Hibbs, 273 E3d at 853-54.
9" See id.
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a close case that the independent judgment of Congress on a consti-
tutional question should make a difference's" As noted above, how-
ever, the Court's treatment of Section 5 legislation from Boerne
through Garrett has hardly been characterized by deference to Con-
gress. 3" Rather, the Court has required narrow tailoring between le-
gitimate ends and means in order to protect two stated values, separa-
don of powers and federalism."' The contrast between the Fifth
Circuit's approach in Kazmier and the Ninth Circuit's approach in
Hibbs demonstrates that congruence and proportionality may serve a
function other than the ones the Court acknowledges, a motive-
searching function that seriously calls the courts' role into question. 332
This FMLA provision need not raise serious separation of powers
questions such as those raised in Boerne.333 In fact, few serious separa-
tion of powers questions arise regarding the legitimacy of Congress's
express ends—here, preventing unconstitutional gender discrimina-
tion. 334 This is unlike the situations in Kimel and Garrett, where the
Court was faced with federal legislation designed to protect groups of
Americans whom the Court had already deemed (in words at least, if
not in deed) non-suspect, older persons and persons with disabili-
ties. 333 In those cases, the Court could plausibly conclude that its duty
to say what the law is was crowded by congressional overreaching, rais-
ing separation of powers concerns. 336 Here, however, the Court has
already declared that gender classifications receive heightened scru-
tiny and must be defended by exceedingly persuasive justifications. 337
In the FMLA, Congress has not provided heightened constitutional
protection to a group the Court has denied heightened protection.3"
329 McConnell, supra note 1, at 155.
3" See supra Part IV.
331 See supra Part IV..
3" See supra Part IV; see also Soifer, supra note 1, at 490 Ms a legal standard, 'propor-
tionality and congruence' necessarily requires judges to make discretionary judgments. No
benchmark is set in advance, and the inquiry required to adjudicate proportionality and
congruence pushes judges into doubly subjective decision-making about policy and poli-
tics, apparently unwilling to be aided by the views of Congress.").
333 See supra notes 72-83 and accompanying text.
sm See supra notes 197-205 and accompanying text.
333 supra Part ILE; supra notes 142-160 and accompanying text; supra notes 241-253
and accompanying text.
339 See supra Part II.13; supra notes 142-160 and accompanying text; supra notes 241-253
and accompanying text.
337 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996).
538 See supra notes 105-124 and accompanying text; supra notes 142-160 and accompa-
nying text.
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For that reason, there seem to be no serious separation of powers
concerns with the end of the FMLA. 339
Are there separation of powers concerns raised by the means
Congress employs in the FMLA?mo Again, it would appear not. As dis-
cussed before, the Court seems to be on pretty shaky footing when it
talks about means related to separation of powers.m Means—at the
least the selection of means—seems to be part of Congress's specialty
in policy-maldng. 342
 If any separation of powers concerns arise in this
area, it would seem that the Court infringes on separation of powers
values when it restricts Congress's choice of means to effectuate oth-
erwise legitimate ends.ms
If the Court is to be concerned here, that concern is more likely
to be founded on federalism interests. 344
 The end of the FMLA provi-
sion should not raise federalism concerns because, as the Court has
acknowledged, there is very little gender-based classification by states
that is constitutiona1. 345
 If there are federalism concerns to be found,
they are more likely to be found in the FMLA's means. 346 The Fifth
Circuit in Kazmier explicitly voiced such concerns, noting that "RI he
respect that must be accorded the States as independent sovereigns
within our federal system" constrains this type of congressional activ-
ity.347
 At the same time, as noted previously, this invocation of federal-
ism begs the question in reference to properly remedial or prophylac-
tic federal antidiscrimination legislation under Section 5. 348
 The
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment vested in the federal govern-
merit, specifically in Congress, the power to protect individual fiber-
ties. 349
 They did so at the expense of state autonomy. 350
 To invoke
3" See supra notes 197-205 and accompanying text; supra notes 241-253 and accompa-
nying text.
340 See supra notes 72-83 and accompanying text; supra notes 254-258 and accompany-
ing text.
so See supra notes 271-277 and accompanying text.
345 See supra notes 271-277 and accompanying text.
34' See supra notes 271-277 and accompanying text.
3" See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text; supra notes 189-196 and accompany-
ing text.
343 See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531; supra notes 278-286 and accompanying text.
346 See supra notes 189-196 and accompanying text; supra notes 250-258 and accompa-
nying text.
347 See 225 F.Sd at, 524.
3" See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
343
 See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
350 See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
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concerns about disrupting the carefully crafted federal-state balance
in the Fourteenth Amendment context is anomalous at best. 351
In any event, invalidating Section 5 legislation based on such
concerns is not unprecedented.352
 United States v. Morrison is an exam-
ple of a case in which the end of the legislation—preventing gender
discrimination—was proper, but the Court used congruence and pro-
portionality to dispute the legislation's means. 353
 The Court took issue
with the means Congress used to remedy and to prevent state-
sponsored discrimination—there, giving women the right to sue pri-
vate individuals in federal court through the use of a federal cause of
action.354
 By rejecting the private suit provision of the VAWA because
it did not involve state action, the Court decided that the Act's means
violated federalism values. 355
 This reasoning is unpersuasive because,
as has been noted,
[i]t is hard to understand this argument as anything other
than a flat rejection of Congress's judgment as to how best to
effectuate its goals. ... The fact that reasonable minds can
disagree over whether the means Congress has chosen to
achieve its goal will in fact be successful should itself put an
end to the inquiry. 355
It is possible that the Court, if it settles this split between the Fifth and
Ninth Circuits, could go out of its way to find a similar federalism-
based objection to the means used in the FMLA, as it did with the
VAWA in Morrison.557
The Fifth Circuit's approach in Kazmier demonstrates that courts
can use the congruence and proportionality test to disagree with the
substance of legislation and with Congress's motive by invoking feder-
alism values when analyzing Congress's choice of means. 358
 Morrison is
a clear precedent for this approach. 358
 This result does not seem to be
consistent with Kimel and Garrett, however, because those cases relied
"1 See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
552
 See Post & Siegel, supra note 1, at 445; supra notes 125-141 and accompanying text.
"3
 See supra notes 125-141 and accompanying text.
3" See supra notes 125-141 and accompanying text.
3" See supra notes 125-141 and accompanying text.
338 Estreicher & Lemos, supra note 1, at 157,158.
"7 See supra notes 125-141 and accompanying text; supra notes 197-240 and accompa-
nying text.
3" See supra notes 210-224 and accompanying text.
3" See supra notes 125-141 and accompanying text.
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so heavily on the involvement of non-suspect groups. 360
 There, courts
used congruence and proportionality to demonstrate that Congress
had acted vigorously where the Court does not grant high constitu-
tional priority.361
 The same cannot be said about the FMLA provision
because, as did the Ninth Circuit, courts acknowledge that deference
is due to Congress. 362
 The possibility that courts, both the Supreme
Court and lower federal courts, can use congruence and proportion-
ality to disagree with the substance of legislation rather than simply to
protect separation of powers and federalism values directly refutes the
purpose of Section 5.363
 By using congruence and proportionality to
locate disfavored congressional motive and legislative substance, the
courts themselves raise serious separation of powers questions for a
democratic society. 364
CONCLUSION
The Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to trans-
form society by guaranteeing to all people basic individual rights.
Congress, in the first place, was to effectuate the Amendment's prom-
ises through its special enforcement power granted in Section 5. Al-
though the Court for more than a century traditionally recognized
Congress's special role under Section 5 and deferred to congressional
judgment, its recent opinions seriously threaten Congress's continued
ability to fulfill its fundamental, constitutionally granted role. The
congruence and proportionality test found in cases from Boerne to
Garrett restricts Congress's choice of means and ends in enacting pro-
phylactic antidiscrimination legislation. It turns the principle of def-
erence to Congress on its head out of separation of powers and feder-
alism concerns that ultimately are unjustifiable. It allows courts to
hide improper inquiries into congressional motive and legislative sub-
stance under a cloak of narrow tailoring requirements. As a result, it
threatens Congress's ability to fulfill its constitutional duty to remedy
and prevent discrimination. Moreover, the congruence and propor-
3130 See supra notes 105-124 and accompanying text; supra notes 142-160 and accompa-
nying text.
mil See supra notes 105-124 and accompanying text; supra notes 142-160 and accompa-
nying text..
332 See supra notes 225-240 and accompanying text.
76.7 See supra notes 241-286 and accompanying text.
3" See supra notes 241-286 and accompanying text.
738
	
Boston College Law Review
	 [Vol. 43:697
tionality test, when misused by courts, tramples on congressional pre-
rogatives and threatens healthy separation of powers values.
KIMBERLY E. DEAN
